

## EXHIBIT 11

1                   IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
2                   FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO  
3                   EASTERN DIVISION

4                   IN RE: NATIONAL PRESCRIPTION       ) No. 17-md-2804  
5                   OPIATE LITIGATION                )  
6                   APPLIES TO ALL CASES              )  
7                                                        )  
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10                   VIDEO DEPOSITION OF SANDRA KINSEY

11                   June 7, 2019  
12                                                        9:05 a.m.

13                   \*HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL - SUBJECT TO FURTHER  
14                                                        CONFIDENTIAL REVIEW\*

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17  
18                   Reporter: John Arndt, CSR, CCR, RDR, CRR  
19                                                        CSR No. 084-004605  
20                                                        CCR No. 1186  
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1 actually found was that HBC had a reduction in the HCP  
2 shipments.

3 Q. Would you expect there to be an increase  
4 in all Giant Eagle Pharmacies based on increases in DEA  
5 quotas?

6 A. It's really looking at an average overall,  
7 that if the DEA nationwide is -- if the DEA nationwide  
8 is raising their quotas as a result of an increase in  
9 prescriptions and an increase in demand for the  
10 product, that a reasonable expectation is that in  
11 general every pharmacy could also have that same type  
12 of increase.

13 So it's very much a generalization when  
14 you talk about what could be expected. In general you  
15 would expect if the DEA says there's a higher demand  
16 for product and there's more prescriptions, then in  
17 general the pharmacies are going to rise at that same  
18 rate, which is why the DEA increased their quota to  
19 begin with, but what we actually found with Giant Eagle  
20 is that the amount of HCP shipments declined.

21 Q. The DEA quotas are done on a nationwide  
22 basis; right?

23 A. That is correct.

24 Q. So you've compared the nationwide

1 thresholds for suspicious order monitoring?

2 A. I believe the date was -- I can't  
3 remember. I'd have to look it up. And what I'm  
4 referring to, just to be clear, is their electronic  
5 system of thresholds; right? That's what you asked me  
6 for? I'm sorry.

7 Q. I did, yeah.

8 A. Yeah.

9 Q. Was there a manual threshold system at  
10 some time before that?

11 A. I don't -- no, there wasn't a manual.  
12 They've had -- they have had different reports that  
13 have been running for years, and those reports have  
14 evolved in order to flag and define different  
15 thresholds. There isn't a single threshold system that  
16 can be deployed that effectively -- that can  
17 effectively identify a true suspicious order. So using  
18 a threshold-type system is -- it's one of the tools  
19 that Giant Eagle employs, and they've been using a  
20 threshold system for several years, and it has evolved  
21 as their technology has evolved.

22 Q. So if you go to Page 49 of your report.  
23 In Paragraph 141 you reference a monthly threshold  
24 system starting in 2013.

1 A. There you go.

2 Q. Is that what you're referring to?

3 A. Yeah. Told you I had to look it up.

4 Q. So that's what you're referring to when  
5 you talk about the automated thresholds; right?

6 A. These are the automated reporting.

7 Q. Right. So beginning in 2013, when an  
8 order was flagged using this system, would that order  
9 be blocked?

10 A. This one in 2013, the order itself, it was  
11 only flagged for needing further investigation. It  
12 doesn't mean that the order was actually suspicious; it  
13 just is a trigger that is flipped so that somebody can  
14 do further investigation.

15 Q. Right. So while that investigation was  
16 ongoing using the system -- starting with the one in  
17 2013 that -- this monthly system that you're talking  
18 about here -- first of all, what sort of employee would  
19 be tasked to do that investigation?

20 A. Well, the employee -- the employee that  
21 was tasked sort of -- the information would be brought  
22 to the attention of the pharmacy district leader, which  
23 by the way I believe in most cases is also a  
24 pharmacist, and they're the ones that are the

1 operational supervisor for the store level.

2 Q. Do you know if the pharmacy district  
3 leader covering Summit and Cuyahoga Counties was a  
4 pharmacist?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And who was that?

7 A. I've read so many reports. I cannot  
8 recall his name.

9 Q. So while that investigation was ongoing by  
10 the pharmacy district leader, what would happen to the  
11 order using -- under the 2013 system?

12 A. Well, in 2013, again, it was a flag, but  
13 in 2013, that order would continue to go through.  
14 However, because Giant Eagle is a captive  
15 self-distributor, at any time if they had a concern  
16 about an order they could certainly stop it and/or  
17 quarantine the product.

18 Q. Did you assess whether that was actually  
19 done in any situation, where an order was flagged under  
20 the system from 2013, it went on through, and it was  
21 pulled back later, quarantined or stopped?

22 A. I believe there was an order or two. I  
23 may have my time frames -- but I believe there were a  
24 couple of orders. However, it was not -- it may even

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1 have been outside these two counties, but there are --  
2 these are some of the questions that I asked as I was  
3 looking at their controls.

4 Q. So are you aware of any orders under this  
5 monthly ordering threshold system in 2013 from Summit  
6 and Cuyahoga Counties that you can cite to or you  
7 intend to cite to that were held or stopped after they  
8 were flagged?

9 A. I don't intend to call anything out as a  
10 specific example in the 2013 time frame.

11 Q. In the -- you reference in Paragraph 141  
12 the threshold system advanced to daily thresholds based  
13 on independent store dynamics, but that part you don't  
14 have a date. Do you know when that occurred?

15 A. I believe that was after they opened GERx  
16 because that was the advancement in technology.

17 Q. Do you intend to testify that the  
18 technology employed by GERx was not available in 2013?

19 A. It wasn't available to Giant Eagle, no.

20 Q. How do you know that?

21 A. Because it was under development.

22 Q. Have you assessed whether similar  
23 technological systems were already being used by other  
24 distributors in 2013?

1 A. No, I have not.

2 Q. You can go to Page 50 of your report. In  
3 Paragraph 144, a few sentences from the bottom, there's  
4 a sentence that says furthermore, such threshold-based.

5 A. Uh-huh.

6 Q. Do you see that sentence?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. You say furthermore, such threshold-based  
9 methods are neither an effective nor a rational means  
10 to detect diversion of controlled substances for  
11 shipments between divisions of the same company.

12 Do you see that?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. So do you intend to testify that the  
15 thresholds are not effective method to detect  
16 suspicious orders?

17 A. Yes, thre -- so threshold meth --  
18 thresholds and establishing a threshold system is only  
19 a tool. It cannot be used in isolation to determine  
20 whether an order is suspicious or not.

21 Q. But once an order is flagged using a  
22 threshold, what you should go next is doing due  
23 diligence to confirm or refute whether it's actually  
24 suspicious; true?

1           A.     Again, the threshold is a tool and how you  
2 design the tool. Every threshold system that you use  
3 has fatal flaws, and you need to understand those  
4 flaws, and by understanding those flaws based on the  
5 nature of your business you can determine then whether  
6 or not an order that is flagged needs further  
7 investigation or not.

8           Q.     So it's your opinion then that just  
9 because an order is flagged it doesn't necessarily  
10 require further due diligence?

11           A.     I'm not saying it doesn't require further  
12 due diligence. What I'm saying is somebody makes --  
13 needs to then make a determination whether or not it  
14 requires further due diligence.

15           Q.     So it needs to be looked at at the very  
16 least; right?

17           A.     That is correct.

18           Q.     What are the fatal flaws with HBC's  
19 threshold system that they employed in 2013?

20           A.     Oh. Well, the threshold system that they  
21 had in 2013 -- it flagged orders. It was an average --  
22 they used an average. They used a nation -- not  
23 nationwide, but their company average, and it was  
24 aggregated through the entire month.

1                   So what you got is as you were reaching  
2 your threshold potentially -- as you were reaching your  
3 threshold you didn't hit those thresholds ever until  
4 the end of the month, so it was more of a look back and  
5 be able to see stores that were constantly -- or not  
6 constantly, but if they were exceeding certain  
7 thresholds, that somebody could keep an eye on them.

8                   Q.        We can go to Page 64 of your report. You  
9 say in the bullet point there starting with despite  
10 implementing -- do you see that?

11                  A.        Uh-huh.

12                  Q.        It says despite implementing a threshold  
13 system to monitor for suspicious orders there was no  
14 change in the number of suspicious orders validating  
15 that existing policies and procedures were sufficient  
16 to prevent theft and diversion.

17                  Do you see that?

18                  A.        Yes.

19                  Q.        You agree this conclusion assumes that the  
20 threshold system that was implemented was adequate;  
21 right?

22                  A.        No, what I'm assuming what is adequate and  
23 even more than adequate are Giant Eagle's policies,  
24 procedures, and controls regarding theft and diversion,

1 and that the threshold system was -- it was a redundant  
2 tool that they added because that seemed to be where  
3 the industry going -- where the industry was going and  
4 what the expectations were in the industry, and all it  
5 proved is that Giant Eagle had sufficient controls to  
6 prevent theft and diversion.

7 Q. But in order for the threshold system to  
8 prove that, you would have to assume that it in and of  
9 itself was an adequate system; right? Otherwise it  
10 can't validate anything.

11 A. Right, and -- well, but based on -- but  
12 even as technology advanced and their systems became  
13 more sophisticated, nothing changed. They didn't  
14 identify even -- they didn't identify more. So yes,  
15 they may have used a rudimentary threshold system in  
16 2013 that was the best thing available to them at the  
17 time, but even as technology advanced and they took  
18 advantage of more advanced software and more  
19 complicated algorithms, the outcome was the same, which  
20 is that no suspi -- or limited suspicious orders, very  
21 little suspicious orders were identified, and therefore  
22 you can conclude and I have concluded that their  
23 controls are sufficient.

24 Q. I didn't see an analysis in your report as

1                   So it sends the different trends, it sends  
2 the prescribing habits, and it sends the ordering  
3 process out of balance. When certain products are no  
4 longer available, then you can see some blips or  
5 disparities.

6 BY MR. BARNES:

7                   Q.     Is there a patient care aspect to  
8 suspicious order monitoring?

9                   MR. BOGLE:   Object to form.

10                  A.     There is. The pharmacy organization --  
11 the pharmacy itself. Let's start there.

12                  Pharmacists are trained to take care of  
13 their patients, and you can't take care of your  
14 patients if you don't have product on the shelf. So  
15 you have an obligation as a pharmacist to carry the  
16 products that your patient base needs, and when you  
17 can't get those products from your wholesaler, it's  
18 devastating, and you can no longer take care of your  
19 patient, and therefore you have to tell your patient to  
20 go somewhere else.

21                  So it's important that whatever suspicious  
22 order monitoring threshold, program, and all of the  
23 different tools that you use -- the things that you put  
24 together need to follow the law, and you need to be

1 compliant, but you also have to remember patient care  
2 so that you don't unnecessarily slow things down or  
3 disrupt access that can cause further ramifications  
4 down the line, which includes further harm to the  
5 patient.

6 BY MR. BARNES:

7 Q. So if I'm interesting you correctly, that  
8 part of this analysis about suspicious orders is -- is  
9 your testimony that you have to take into account the  
10 legitimate needs of patients?

11 MR. BOGLE: Object to form.

12 A. Yes. You can't just stop an order because  
13 it's flagged by a system, because by stopping that  
14 order that drug is not getting to the store and  
15 therefore the store then can't fill prescriptions.

16 BY MR. BARNES:

17 Q. You know Dr. McCann -- he had like five  
18 different ways of playing with the numbers in terms of  
19 how many suspicious orders, and do you recall one of  
20 his methodologies would have identified upwards of 80  
21 to 90 percent of every order ever input by everybody as  
22 suspicious? Does that make any sense to you  
23 whatsoever?

24 MR. BOGLE: Object to form.

1           A.     No, it makes absolutely no sense. His  
2 methodologies were full of flaws.

3     BY MR. BARNES:

4           Q.     Are you aware of the DEA being required to  
5 consider patient needs and making sure there was an  
6 adequate supply getting to the patients as part of  
7 their regulatory obligations?

8           MR. BOGLE:   Object to form.

9           A.     The DEA's regular -- and where I would  
10 apply this is in their quotas, as the DEA is  
11 determining how quotas are formed and what they should  
12 be used for. The DEA's obligation is to make sure that  
13 there is enough product in market to meet the needs and  
14 the demand of the patients.

15     BY MR. BARNES:

16           Q.     You provided a lot of testimony and your  
17 report specifically addresses HBC and the GERx  
18 warehouse at Giant Eagle?

19           A.     Yes.

20           Q.     And you've -- I don't want to go over  
21 everything, but you've opined that Giant Eagle has met  
22 the Controlled Substances Act in many different ways  
23 and in some ways exceeded the requirements of that act?

24           A.     Yes.

1 Q. And does that cover the time period in  
2 which HBC and GERx were actually distributing  
3 controlled substances?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. And that began when; do you know?

6 A. In 2009.

7 Q. When you talked about the suspicious order  
8 monitoring, were you limiting your testimony in any way  
9 to so-called threshold systems that use formulas or  
10 algorithms?

11 MR. BOGLE: Object to form.

12 A. No, as I've stated before, threshold  
13 systems are only a tool to be used as potentially --  
14 you don't even have to use it. It's not even required  
15 by law, but you can use a threshold-type system as a  
16 tool in your toolbox as it relates to a suspicious  
17 order monitoring program.

18 BY MR. BARNES:

19 Q. You were asked some questions about being  
20 licensed and what that means. I just want to follow up  
21 with a few questions. Were you testifying that simply  
22 having a license meant you were in compliance, or  
23 something else?

24 MR. BOGLE: Object to form.

1           A.     By having a license, the regulatory  
2 authority has said that you have controls, policies,  
3 and procedures in place they find legally relevant to  
4 rules and regulations that they have created and  
5 they're enforcing.

6 BY MR. BARNES:

7           Q.     And you talked a little bit about  
8 preinspection -- preinspections by the DEA. And by  
9 pre, I mean before you start distributing, another  
10 inspection right after you start distributing, and then  
11 periodic inspections throughout the time you are  
12 distributing -- is that -- am I summarizing your  
13 testimony correctly?

14           MR. BOGLE: Object to form.

15           A.     Yes.

16 BY MR. BARNES:

17           Q.     Now are those inspections rigorous or are  
18 they flimsy or somewhere in between?

19           MR. BOGLE: Object to form.

20           A.     No, those inspections are extremely  
21 rigorous, and they give full feedback whether or not  
22 you're meeting their expectations of what needs to  
23 occur.

24 BY MR. BARNES:

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1 Q. Does it include a review of suspicious  
2 order monitoring systems?

3 A. It does.

4 MR. BOGLE: Object to form.

5 BY MR. BARNES:

6 Q. Does it include a review of inventory  
7 management systems?

8 A. It does.

9 Q. Does it include a detailed review of  
10 transactions within your systems to make sure controls  
11 are in place and working?

12 MR. BOGLE: Object to form.

13 A. Yes.

14 BY MR. BARNES:

15 Q. And did you see testimony in the record  
16 for the Giant Eagle depositions that HBC and GERx were  
17 subjected to pre-inspections, post-inspections, and  
18 audits -- periodic audits?

19 A. Yes, I did see that testimony.

20 Q. And did you also see the testimony that  
21 the DEA never once suggested that Giant Eagle was not  
22 in compliance?

23 MR. BOGLE: Object to form.

24 A. The DEA did not find any deficiencies.

1 BY MR. BARNES:

2 Q. And is that an important factor for you  
3 when you made the evaluations you did in this case and  
4 came to the conclusions that you did?

5 A. Absolutely, yes.

6 Q. You were asked some questions about  
7 training -- training at Giant Eagle. Do you recall any  
8 deposition testimony about so-called CBT,  
9 computer-based training?

10 A. I do, yes.

11 Q. And do you recall specifically the Walt  
12 Durr and Greg Carlson depositions talking about  
13 training?

14 MR. BOGLE: Object to form.

15 A. Yes, they went -- they spoke of the  
16 different training modalities from computer-based  
17 training to even having trainers. Their PDLs often  
18 gave little mini training seminars or on-the-job  
19 training, so it was constant education on the policies,  
20 procedures, and controls that Giant Eagle wanted them  
21 to follow.

22 BY MR. BARNES:

23 Q. Is that pretty standard in the industry in  
24 your experience -- that type of training?